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In this paper we investigate the use of classical logic as a basis for instantiating abstract
argumentation frameworks. In the ﬁrst part, we propose desirable properties of attack
relations in the form of postulates and classify several well-known attack relations from
the literature with regards to the satisfaction of these postulates. Furthermore, we provide
additional postulates that help us prove characterisation results for these attack relations.
In the second part of the paper, we present postulates regarding the logical content of
extensions of argument graphs that may be constructed with classical logic. We then
conduct a comprehensive study of the status of these postulates in the context of the
various combinations of attack relations and extension semantics.
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1. Introduction
Argumentation is an important cognitive process that involves the generation and evaluation of arguments. There have
been a number of proposals for capturing this cognitive process in computational models of argumentation (for example
[1–6] and for reviews [7–10]). Amongst these proposals, two signiﬁcant, intersecting and non-exclusive streams can be
distinguished.
Abstract argumentation which focuses on the attack relations between arguments and usually considers arguments them-
selves to be atomic objects (for example [11,3,12,13]). This approach offers insight into how arguments interact
and achieve acceptability solely in terms of the attacks that may exist between them. Furthermore, this approach
allows for harnessing tools from graph theory.
Logical argumentation which considers arguments as complex entities with an internal structure that is governed by a
certain logical language (for example [1,14,4–6,15]). In general, using logic for formalising argumentation enables
the harnessing of natural concepts for disagreement, or attack between arguments, such as inconsistency. In ad-
dition, this approach allows using logical entailment for drawing conclusions that may serve as the claims of
arguments.
A wealth of research has been conducted in the context of these two streams, prompting the question whether their
derived knowledge can be combined to deliver models of argumentation that are more expressive, more natural or more
powerful. Proposals of frameworks that are situated in the intersection of these two areas exist (for example [16,4,5,17–
20]) but (apart from [16,19,20]), they tend to focus on specialised, defeasible logics as their language of choice. Defeasible
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: n.gorogiannis@cs.ucl.ac.uk (N. Gorogiannis), a.hunter@cs.ucl.ac.uk (A. Hunter).0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2010.12.003
1480 N. Gorogiannis, A. Hunter / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1479–1497logics are a useful tool for many application areas where the expressiveness requirements are not great, but cannot readily
encompass applications where for example disjunction or true negation are required.
Therefore, it would seem that an argumentation system that uses classical logic as its language, while explicitly employ-
ing abstract argumentation-style semantics, is attractive for several reasons. It would beneﬁt directly from the large number
of results on abstract argumentation frameworks produced in the last decade and, in addition, it would offer expressiveness
that is moderate but still higher than currently used defeasible logics for argumentation.
It is the exploration of this gap, then, that this paper is aimed at. Proposing such a framework is not particularly compli-
cated as there is a natural, if not unproblematic, way to instantiate an abstract argumentation framework using a knowledge
base in classical logic. What is little known about such systems is the properties they ought to satisfy for them to be useful
and predictable. While attempts have been made along these lines (e.g., [18] on rule-based systems and [19] on classical
logic) such work is far from complete. Moreover, after such postulates have been proposed and perhaps gained acceptance,
the more important question remains as to which argumentation systems will satisfy them. Compounding the diﬃculty of
these questions is the fact that components of both logical and abstract argumentation, such as attack relations and exten-
sion semantics respectively, can be instantiated to a multiplicity of deﬁnitions, thus considerably enlarging the number of
combinations to check. So we see that given the interesting possibilities raised in [16,18,19], there is a need to undertake
a systematic analysis of instantiating abstract argumentation with classical logic that considers a comprehensive range of
attack relations and semantics for extensions. Furthermore, it is desirable that this is undertaken in a modular way using a
framework of intuitive postulates.
Given these concerns, in this paper we consider an intuitive way to generate a set of arguments, starting from a
knowledge base in classical logic (along with preliminaries, in Section 2). We then review the attack relations for logi-
cal argumentation in the literature and set out postulates that delineate desirable properties (Section 3). In addition, we
investigate the status of these properties for these attack relations and then go on to propose additional postulates that
allow us to prove characterisation results, i.e., to show that an arbitrary attack relation is one of the reviewed ones if and
only if it satisﬁes a particular combination of postulates. Following that, we outline a set of postulates which express gen-
eral properties of the logical content of the extensions of logical argument graphs (Section 4). To achieve that, we employ
and generalise properties found in the literature as well as novel postulates that speciﬁcally address the issues arising from
the potential extension multiplicity that many extension semantics allow. The status of these postulates is examined next
(Section 5), over the several combinations of extension semantics and attack relations possible. Finally, we conclude and
discuss existing work that relates to this paper (Section 6).
2. Preliminaries
We will use a propositional logic 〈L,〉 with a countable set of propositional letters and constants ,⊥ for truth and
falsum respectively. We write Φ  ψ to mean that the set of formulae Φ entails the formula ψ , and φ  ψ as shorthand for
{φ}  ψ . The notation ∧Φ where Φ is a set of formulae, will be used to denote the conjunction of all formulae in Φ . We
also use φ ≡ ψ to denote logical equivalence of the formulae φ and ψ in the meta-language (i.e., φ  ψ and ψ  φ), and
Φ ≡ Ψ mean logical equivalence of sets of formulae, i.e., ∧Φ ≡∧Ψ . From now on , the knowledge base, will stand for
a ﬁnite set of individually consistent propositional formulae. We will denote the set of minimal inconsistent subsets of 
with MI() (that is to say, MI() = {Φ ⊆  | Φ  ⊥ and for all Ψ ⊂ Φ,Ψ  ⊥}).
In order to give meaning and structure to the arguments in an abstract argumentation framework, we adopt the most
common deﬁnition in logical argumentation that separates the evidence, or support, from the claim, or conclusion of an
argument.
Deﬁnition 1. An argument is a pair 〈Φ,φ〉 such that Φ ⊆  is a consistent, ﬁnite set of formulae, φ is a formula such that
Φ  φ, and no proper subset of Φ entails φ.
The (countably inﬁnite) set of all arguments is denoted by A. If A = 〈Φ,φ〉 is an argument, we will use the functions
S(A) = Φ to denote the support of A and C(A) = φ to denote the claim of A. We say that two arguments A, B are
equivalent if S(A) = S(B) and C(A) ≡ C(B), and denote this by A ≡ B . Notice that this notion of equivalence is semantic
with respect to the claim, but syntactic with respect to the support. This compromise aims at accommodating the fact that
users of a logical argumentation system may view the formulae in the input knowledge base as resources, in the sense that
having two ways to prove the same thing should give rise to two different arguments that are not conﬂated together. Also,
we will say that A is a sub-argument of B if S(A) ⊆ S(B).
Deﬁnition 2. An argument graph (or simply, graph) is a pair 〈N, R〉 where N ⊆ A is a ﬁnite set of arguments and R is a
non-reﬂexive binary relation on N . For each (A, B) ∈ R , we say that A attacks B .
We will only consider non-reﬂexive attack relations in this paper. While attack relations with self-loops have been
of some interest in the abstract argumentation community, they do not normally feature in logical argumentation since
arguments are usually required to be consistent, as above, and the attack relation deﬁnition ordinarily relates attack to
inconsistency.
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EX(Γ ) ⊆ EY(Γ ).
We use the convenience functions Nodes(〈N, R〉) = N (the nodes of the graph) and Arcs(〈N, R〉) = R (the arcs of the
graph). Whenever we are concerned with an argument graph Γ and there is no possibility of confusion, we will understand
the phrase ‘an argument A in Γ ’ to mean the qualiﬁed phrase ‘an argument A ∈ Nodes(Γ )’.
We recall the following notions from abstract argumentation.
Deﬁnition 3. Let Γ be an argument graph and S ⊆ Nodes(Γ ) a set of arguments.
1. S attacks an argument B if there exists A ∈ S such that A attacks B .
2. S defends an argument A if S attacks B for every argument B such that B attacks A.
3. S is conﬂict-free if there is no A ∈ S such that S attacks A.
4. S is admissible if it is conﬂict-free and it defends all of its members.
5. S is a stable extension if S is conﬂict-free and S attacks A for all A ∈ Nodes(Γ ) \ S .
6. S is a complete extension if it is admissible and contains every argument it defends.
7. S is a preferred extension if it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set.
8. S is the grounded extension if it is the least ﬁxed point of F(X) = {A ∈ Nodes(Γ ) | X defends A}.
9. S is a semi-stable extension if it is a complete extension and the set S ∪ {A ∈ Nodes(Γ ) | S attacks A} is maximal
w.r.t. set inclusion.
10. S is the ideal extension if it is the maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set that is contained within every preferred
extension.
Items 1–8 are due to Dung [3], item 9 is due to Caminada [12] and item 10 is due to Alferes, Dung and Pereira [11] and
Dung, Mancarella and Toni [13]. The notions 5–10 are also referred to as argumentation semantics or extension semantics in
the argumentation literature. Note that for a particular argument graph there may be no stable extensions. Also, there may
be more than one stable, complete, preferred and semi-stable extensions, but only one grounded and one ideal extension.
In addition, the is-a relationships shown in Fig. 1 hold, proved in [3,12,13].
For any extension semantics X we will use EX(Γ ) to denote the set of X-extensions of the argument graph Γ . We will
use the subscripts: ‘st’ for stable, ‘co’ for complete, ‘pr’ for preferred, ‘gr’ for grounded, ‘ss’ for semi-stable and ‘id’ for ideal.
So, for example, Epr(Γ ) will stand for the set of preferred extensions of Γ . In addition, we deﬁne two sets of arguments for
a graph Γ , meant to capture sceptical and credulous acceptance of arguments, respectively:
πX(Γ ) =
⋂
S∈EX(Γ )
S, σX(Γ ) =
⋃
S∈EX(Γ )
S
So, for example, we will say that an argument A in Γ is sceptically accepted in the preferred semantics if A ∈ πpr(Γ ).
Clearly, πX(Γ ) ⊆ σX(Γ ) for any semantics X, σgr(Γ ) = πgr(Γ ) and σid(Γ ) = πid(Γ ). Note if EX(Γ ) = ∅, then we have
πX(Γ ) = σX(Γ ) = ∅.
Now that we have deﬁned the notion of a logical argument, the question of how to deﬁne the notion of attack arises.
In the context of abstract argumentation, an attack relation is, as we have seen, a binary relation on a set of arguments.
While this is an exact description of what kind of mathematical object we use, it is of no help in explaining how we might
deﬁne such a relation. Indeed, most, if not all, attack relations on logical arguments from the literature are deﬁned by way
of a criterion that operates on a pair of logical arguments and uses no other information about the set of arguments this
pair belongs in. Thus, a natural way for expressing this is through a function. An attack function D : A × A → {,⊥} is a
boolean-valued function on ordered pairs of arguments. Such an attack function can be seen as the characteristic function
of an attack relation, i.e., a set of pairs of arguments. For this reason from now on we will abuse terminology slightly and
talk about attack functions and attack relations interchangeably.
We review below several attack relations from the literature.
1482 N. Gorogiannis, A. Hunter / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 1479–1497Fig. 2. Containment between attack relations. An arrow from D1 to D2 indicates that D1 ⊆ D2.
Deﬁnition 4. Let A and B be two arguments. We deﬁne the following attack functions by listing the conditions under which
D(A, B) = . On the left we list the symbols for each attack function.
(DD) A is a defeater of B if C(A)  ¬∧S(B).
(DDD) A is a direct defeater of B if there is φ ∈ S(B) such that C(A)  ¬φ.
(DU ) A is an undercut of B if there is Ψ ⊆ S(B) such that C(A) ≡ ¬∧Ψ .
(DDU) A is a direct undercut of B if there is φ ∈ S(B) such that C(A) ≡ ¬φ.
(DCU ) A is a canonical undercut of B if C(A) ≡ ¬∧S(B).
(DR ) A is a rebuttal of B if C(A) ≡ ¬C(B).
(DDR) A is a defeating rebuttal of B if C(A)  ¬C(B).
It is straightforward to see that A is a defeater of B iff S(B) ∪ {C(A)} is inconsistent, and that A is a defeating rebuttal
of B iff {C(A),C(B)} is inconsistent.
The concepts behind these attack relations have been very widely employed in the literature, so citing originating papers
with exactness is diﬃcult. It is safe to say, however, that rebuttals appear in [1] and also [21]. Direct undercuts appear
in [2,22]. Undercuts and canonical undercuts were proposed in the above form and studied extensively in [23,6]. Note that
canonical undercuts were originally deﬁned using the notion of maximal conservativeness but for simplicity we use the above
equivalent deﬁnition.
Note that, if D1, D2 are two attack functions we will use them as relations in order to express a containment relation,
e.g., D1 ⊆ D2, meaning that if D1(A, B) =  then D2(A, B) = . Then, it is easy to see that several containment relations
hold as pictured in Fig. 2.
Having chosen an attack function D and given a knowledge base  the question remains as to how an argument graph
is generated. There is a natural deﬁnition for this, which we call an argument generator.
Deﬁnition 5. The argument generator GD is deﬁned as follows, given an attack function D and a knowledge base .
GD = 〈N, R〉
N = {A ∈ A ∣∣ S(A) ⊆ }
R = {(A, B) ∣∣ A, B ∈ N and D(A, B) = }
By deﬁnition, it is always the case that for any formula φ and knowledge base ,
Nodes
(
GD
)⊆ Nodes(G∪{φ}D
)
, Arcs
(
GD
)⊆ Arcs(G∪{φ}D
)
In this paper, we have focused on the most commonly considered deﬁnition for a logical argument (i.e. 〈Φ,ψ〉 is an
argument iff Φ is a minimal consistent set of formulae that entails ψ ). However, there are other proposals that relax
these conditions for an argument. For instance, in assumption-based argumentation [17], there is not a requirement for the
premises to be minimal. Further relaxations of these conditions for an argument have been considered in [24] resulting in
approximate arguments such as enthymemes which have insuﬃcient premises for entailing the claim.
An alternative deﬁnition for an argument has been proposed in [14], and revisited in [16], in which the consistency
constraint is such that the premises Φ of an argument need to be consistent with the a designated subset of the knowl-
edgebase. The idea behind this reﬁnement is that there is a consistent subset Π of the knowledgebase that can be regarded
as correct, and the support of any argument would need to be consistent with Π . This also leads to further instances of
counterargument such as the following for arguments A and B:
• A disagrees with B iff Π ∪ {C(A),C(B)}  ⊥.
• A counterargues B iff there is an argument C such that C is a subargument of B and A disagrees with C .
• A weakly-undercuts B iff there is an argument C such that C is a subargument of B and A is a rebuttal of C .
If we assume that Π = ∅, then we can compare these deﬁnitions with those given in Deﬁnition 4. For instance, A dis-
agrees with B iff A is a defeating rebuttal of B . And, A counterargues B iff there is a subargument C of B and A is a
defeating rebuttal of C .
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In this section, we propose postulates relevant to attack functions. From now on, A, B,C and their primed versions will
stand for arguments.
if A ≡ A′, B ≡ B ′ then D(A, B) = D(A′, B ′)(D0)
The above postulate is a classic syntax-independence requirement: the syntax of the components of two arguments should
not play a role in deciding whether there is an attack between those arguments.
if D(A, B) =  then {C(A)} ∪ S(B)  ⊥(D1)
Postulate D1 mandates that if an argument attacks another, then it must be that the claim of the former is inconsistent
with the support of the latter. This requirement reﬂects a fundamental assumption in logical argumentation, namely that if
two arguments are logically consistent there cannot be any attack between them. In addition, a further expectation is that
not only the supports of the arguments are inconsistent, but also the claim of the attacker with the support of the attacked
argument. This ﬁts in with the view that an argument can be decomposed into a claim and a set of evidence for that claim
(here, the support). In this context, it is not enough to have inconsistent collections of evidence for an attack to take place;
the attacking argument must make it speciﬁc in its claim that it contradicts the evidence offered by the attacked argument.
Note also that since A is a defeater of B if and only if S(B)∪ {C(A)} is inconsistent, we see that the D1 postulate mandates
that an attack must be contained in the defeat relation.
if D(A, B) =  and C(C) ≡ C(A) then D(C, B) = (D2)
if D(A, B) =  and S(B) = S(C) then D(A,C) = (D3)
The postulates D2 and D3 impose certain fairness restrictions on existing attacks: D2 requires that all arguments that have
equivalent claims with that of A should attack B; D3, similarly, requires that if A attacks B then all arguments with the
same support with that of B should also be attacked by A. It is of note that these two postulates have some overlap with D0,
but they are not equivalent, since in each case the new argument is not necessarily ≡-equivalent to the existing argument.
It is possible to strengthen these postulates as follows. Note, D3′ was proposed by Amgoud and Besnard [19].
if D(A, B) =  and C(C)  C(A) then D(C, B) = (D2′)
if D(A, B) =  and S(B) ⊆ S(C) then D(A,C) = (D3′)
Again, suppose that A attacks B . Postulate D2′ requires that any argument with a stronger claim than A, i.e., one that
logically entails that of A, should also attack anything A attacks. Postulate D3′ mandates that any argument whose support
is a superset of that of B , and thus stronger than that of B , should also be attacked by A. Clearly, D2′ and D3′ entail their
weaker versions, D2 and D3, respectively.
We list below another postulate that makes reference to the argument generator. This postulate essentially only con-
strains D in relation to the input knowledge base .
if Arcs
(
GD
)= ∅ then MI() = ∅(D4)
This postulate can be read as follows: if we restrict D on the arguments that can be generated from  and ﬁnd that no two
such arguments attack each other, then it must be that  itself is consistent (hence it has no minimal inconsistent subsets).
It should be easy to see that D1 entails the right-to-left version of D4 and, therefore, these two postulates together entail
that the resulting argument graph has no arcs iff  is consistent.
We examine now whether the attack functions described in Deﬁnition 4 satisfy the above postulates.
Proposition 6. The attack functions in {DD , DU , DCU , DDU, DDD, DR , DDR} satisfy the attack function postulates according to
Table 1.
Table 1
Postulates satisﬁed by the reviewed attack functions.
DD DDD DU DDU DCU DR DDR
D0       
D1       
D2       
D2′   × × × × 
D3      × ×
D3′     × × ×
D4       
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D0 is clearly satisﬁed by all the attack functions, as their deﬁnitions use logical equivalence or entailment for the claims
and the subset relation or equality for the supports.
D1 is satisﬁed by all the attack functions.
D2 is satisﬁed by all the attack functions due to the fact that all attack function deﬁnitions put conditions on the claim of
the attacking argument that cannot distinguish between logically equivalent claims.
D2′ will be satisﬁed by those attack functions that are tolerant to strengthening the claim of the attacking argument. Thus,
all attack functions based on the notion of undercutting will fail this postulate.
D3 is satisﬁed by all the attack functions except for those based on the notion of rebuttal for obvious reasons.
D3′ is satisﬁed by all the attack functions that satisfy D3 except canonical undercutting, which by its deﬁnition does not
tolerate changing the support of the attacked argument to a non-logically equivalent set.
D4 is satisﬁed by all attack functions. Suppose that Arcs(GD ) = ∅ but MI() = ∅ and let M ∈ MI() and ψ ∈ M . Since M
is a minimal inconsistent set it is easy to see that A = 〈M \ {ψ},¬ψ〉 is an argument in Nodes(GD ). Also, trivially, B =
〈{ψ},ψ〉 is an argument in Nodes(GD ). But for any attack function D ∈ {DD , DU , DCU , DDU, DDD, DR , DDR}, D(A, B) = ,
thus Arcs(GD ) = ∅, a contradiction. 
The postulates D0–D4 are useful in classifying the attack functions we review, as evidenced by Table 1 in Proposition 6.
We can also use these postulates for a characterisation of the attack functions reviewed here. By characterisation we mean
a result that guarantees that an arbitrary attack function D satisﬁes a speciﬁc list of postulates if and only if D is a speciﬁc
member of {DD , DU , DCU , DDU, DDD, DR , DDR}. To that end, we present a list of further postulates that will be useful in
characterising the reviewed attack functions. We ﬁrst look at postulate D1 and two variations.
if D(A, B) =  then ∃φ ∈ S(B) s.t. C(A)  ¬φ(D1′)
if D(A, B) =  then C(A)  ¬C(B)(D1′′)
Where D1 requires inconsistency of the attacking arguments’s claim and the attacked argument’s support, D1′ and D1′′ put
more stringent requirements on the claim of the attacker. Also, note that D1′ and D1′′ imply D1.
Next we introduce four postulates that work in tandem with one of the versions of D1 to provide one direction of
the characterisation result. So each D1 variant works with a D5 variant to ﬁx the nature of the relationship between the
support of an argument and the claim of a counterargument. For instance, D1′′ says that for D(A, B) =  to hold, C(A)
entails ¬C(B), and D5′′ says that for D(A, B) =  to hold, ¬C(A) entails C(B). Therefore, together D1′′ and D5′′ say that
C(A) is equivalent to ¬C(B). It can be seen that D5 implies D5′ and D5′′ , and that D5′′′ implies D5′ .
if D(A, B) =  then ¬C(A) 
∧
S(B)(D5)
if D(A, B) =  then ∃φ ∈ S(B) s.t. ¬C(A)  φ(D5′)
if D(A, B) =  then ¬C(A)  C(B)(D5′′)
if D(A, B) =  then ∃X ⊆ S(B) s.t. ¬C(A) ≡
∧
X(D5′′′)
Finally, it is of note that all postulates presented up to now are universally quantiﬁed over arguments. This means that they
cannot force the existence of attacks, but only constrain those present. Hence, the empty attack relation D∅(A, B) = ⊥ will
trivially satisfy all these postulates. Thus, for the purposes of providing characterisation results we need a set of postulates
that guarantee the existence of attacks. We present these below:
if {C(A)} ∪ S(B)  ⊥ then there exists C s.t. C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = (D6)
if ∃φ ∈ S(B) s.t. C(A)  ¬φ then there exists C s.t. C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = (D6′)
if C(A)  ¬C(B) then there exists C s.t. C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = (D6′′)
if ∃X ⊆ S(B) s.t. C(A) ≡ ¬
∧
X then D(A, B) = (D6′′′)
It can be observed that for the ﬁrst three of the above postulates, the consequent is the same, whereas the consequent of
the fourth is more stringent about the nature of the attack, and each of the postulates guarantees existence of an argument
involved in an attack. Also, the conditions for the ﬁrst three postulates match the consequent of the corresponding D1
postulate. In addition, D6 implies D6′ and D6′′ .
For an attack function D that satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6, we show that D is a super-relation of DCU (i.e. DCU ⊆ D).
Proposition 7. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6 and that A, B are two arguments in GD . If C(A) ≡ ¬
∧
S(B), then
D(A, B) = .
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Attack functions and the postulates they are characterised by. Each attack function is characterised by the conjunction of the postulates located in the
appropriate row, column and (optionally) cell.
D1, D6 D1′ , D6′ D1′′ , D6′′ D6′′′
D2′ DD DDD DDR –
D2 DCU (D5) DDU (D5′) DR (D5′′) –
– – – – DU (D5′′′)
Proof. The assumption C(A) ≡ ¬∧S(B) entails {C(A)} ∪ S(B)  ⊥, thus postulate D6 applies, producing an argument C
such that C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = . Note that C need not belong to Nodes(GD ). By D1 it follows that C(C)  ¬
∧
S(B).
This in turn means that C(A) ≡ C(C) ≡ ¬∧S(B). Applying D2 yields that D(A, B) = . 
Next we look at the class of attack functions satisfying the postulates D1′ , D2 and D6′ . An attack function satisfying
these postulates would be a super-relation of DDU (i.e. DDU ⊆ D).
Proposition 8. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1′ , D2 and D6′ and that A, B are two arguments in GD . If C(A) ≡ ¬φ where φ ∈ S(B),
then D(A, B) = .
Proof. The assumption C(A) ≡ ¬φ where φ ∈ S(B) allows us to use postulate D6′ , producing an argument C such that
C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = . By D1′ it follows that C(C)  ¬ψ for some ψ ∈ S(B). Combining these gives us that ψ  φ,
so in order to preserve the minimality of S(B) it must be that φ = ψ . This further means that C(A) ≡ C(C). Applying D2
yields that D(A, B) = . 
For an attack relation D that satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ , we show that D is a super-relation of DR (i.e. DR ⊆ D).
Proposition 9. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ and that A, B are two arguments in GD . If C(A) ≡ ¬C(B), then
D(A, B) = .
Proof. Using postulate D6′′ produces an argument C such that C(A)  C(C) and D(C, B) = . By D1′′ it follows that
C(C)  ¬C(B). Combining these gives us that C(A) ≡ C(C). Applying D2 yields that D(A, B) = . 
We now show that each D ∈ {DD , DU , DCU , DDU, DDD, DR , DDR} can be characterised using the postulates constraining
the attack function.
Proposition 10. The following characterisation results hold and they are summarised in Table 2.
• D = DD iff D satisﬁes D1, D2′ and D6.
• D = DDD iff D satisﬁes D1′ , D2′ and D6′ .
• D = DDR iff D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2′ and D6′′ .
• D = DCU iff D satisﬁes D1, D2, D5 and D6.
• D = DDU iff D satisﬁes D1′ , D2, D5′ and D6′ .
• D = DR iff D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2, D5′′ and D6′′ .
• D = DU iff D satisﬁes D5′′′ and D6′′′ .
Proof. We prove the desired results by showing that D ⊆ Dx and D ⊇ Dx iff the appropriate postulates are satisﬁed by D ,
for each appropriate Dx . We will omit the proofs for the left-to-right direction as they are straightforward.
(DD) Suppose D satisﬁes D1, D2′ and D6. It is easy to see that D1 ensures that D ⊆ DD . To show that D ⊇ DD , suppose
that DD(A, B) =  for some A, B . This means that {C(A)} ∪ S(B)  ⊥, thus satisfying the conditions of D6, which in
turn provides an argument C such that D(C, B) =  and C(A)  C(C). By applying D2′ we obtain that D(A, B) = .
(DDD) Suppose D satisﬁes D1′ , D2′ and D6′ . It is easy to see that D1′ ensures that D ⊆ DDD . To show that D ⊇ DDD ,
suppose that DDD(A, B) =  for some A, B . This means that ∃φ ∈ S(B) s.t. C(A)  ¬φ thus satisfying the conditions
of D6′ , which in turn provides an argument C such that D(C, B) =  and C(A)  C(C). By applying D2′ we obtain
that D(A, B) = .
(DDR) Suppose D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2′ and D6′′ . It is easy to see that D1′′ ensures that D ⊆ DDR . To show that D ⊇ DDR , sup-
pose that DDR(A, B) =  for some A, B . This means that C(A)  ¬C(B), thus satisfying the conditions of D6′′ , which
in turn provides an argument C such that D(C, B) =  and C(A)  C(C). By applying D2′ we obtain D(A, B) = .
(DCU ) Suppose D satisﬁes D1, D2, D5 and D6. D1 and D5 guarantee that if D(A, B) =  then DCU (A, B) = . For the
other direction, we apply Proposition 7 to get D ⊇ DCU .
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there is φ ∈ S(B) such that C(A)  ¬φ and D5′ that there is ψ ∈ S(B) such that ¬C(A)  ψ . Combining these gives
us that ¬ψ  ¬φ, or φ  ψ . The deﬁnition of what is an argument enforces minimality, meaning that it must be that
φ = ψ , which in turn yields that C(A) ≡ ¬φ, completing the proof. For the other direction, we apply Proposition 8
to get D ⊇ DDU .
(DR) Suppose D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2, D5′′ and D6′′ . D1′′ and D5′′ together entail that D ⊆ DR . For the other direction, we
apply Proposition 9 to get D ⊇ DR .
(DU ) Suppose D satisﬁes D5′′′ and D6′′′ . To show that D ⊆ DU , assume that D(A, B) = . Using D5′′′ we get that there
exists X ⊆ S(B) such that ¬C(A) ≡∧ X . Therefore, ∃X ⊆ S(B) such that C(A) ≡ ¬∧ X . For the other direction, from
DU (A, B) = , ∃X ⊆ S(B) such that C(A) ≡ ¬∧ X . Therefore, via D6′′′ , we get D(A, B) = , and hence D ⊇ DU . 
In this section, we have provided a framework of postulates for the attack relation and shown it can be used for classi-
fying and characterising instances of attack relation. In the next section, we will use these postulates for the attack relation
in order to consider postulates for logical argument graphs. Our postulates D0–D4, and the variants D2′ and D3′ , provide
intuitive proposals for necessary constraints on attack relations, and then postulates D5 and variants, and D6 and variants,
provide the extra constraints to characterise them in Proposition 10. If we only have D0–D4, then there is too much latitude
in the constraints they provide, and as a result they permit undesirable attack relations (i.e. if we just seek to satisfy D0
to D4, then we allow attack relations with counter-intuitive behaviour). We believe that new proposals for attack relations
will be made where the underlying logic is classical logic, or another rich formalism such as a description logic, a temporal
logic, or a spatial logic, and so we believe having these characterisations as given in this paper will be helpful in deﬁning
attack relations for new situations.
4. Postulates for logical argument graphs
The intention behind the argument generator (given in Deﬁnition 5) is the generation of an argument graph that can be
used with the extension deﬁnitions proposed in the literature and reviewed in Section 2. Doing so will yield in each case
one or more extensions, each of which is a set of arguments. From the perspective of abstract argumentation we would stop
at this point since nothing more can be said about the result using only the information that is encoded in the argument
graph. However, since these arguments are logical arguments, it is possible to examine the resulting extensions further.
To this end, we discuss and propose some postulates about the content of extensions. We do not, however, desire to
constrain or propose deﬁnitions of extensions; this is beyond the scope of our paper and much existing work on alternative
extensions is easy to ﬁnd. What we do desire, here, is to provide an extension-independent set of postulates that are
reasonable and succinct.
We introduce some additional phraseology and notation here. A set of formulae Ψ is called free if Ψ ⊆  \⋃M∈MI() M .
This deﬁnition is obviously dependent on ; we omit stating this for clarity and without danger of confusion. An argument
A is called a free argument if S(A) is free. The set of free arguments belonging to a graph Γ (that has been returned by
the generator GD ) is denoted by FreeArgs(Γ ) and the set of non-free arguments by NonFreeArgs(Γ ). We say that a set of
arguments S supports a formula φ and write S  φ if there is an argument A ∈ S such that C(A)  φ.
In order to formulate the postulates we will assume that X is any of the reviewed semantics. We ﬁrst look at consistency
postulates. Let D be an attack function and  a knowledge base.
⋃
A∈πX
(
G

D
)
S(A)  ⊥(CN1)
⋃
A∈S
S(A)  ⊥, for all S ∈ EX
(
GD
)
(CN2)
⋃
A∈πX(GD )
C(A)  ⊥(CN1′)
⋃
A∈S
C(A)  ⊥, for all S ∈ EX
(
GD
)
(CN2′)
Note that these postulates are understood to be universally quantiﬁed over . The above postulates are variations of the
requirement that certain arguments’ supports or claims must be consistent together. The expectation is that once an ex-
tension is obtained, then the arguments contained in it present a somehow consistent set of assumptions. Applying this
restriction to the supports of the arguments or to their claims, and to the sceptically accepted set of arguments or to all
extensions individually, yields the versions of this principle listed above. The reason we provide all four versions is that it
is not yet clear whether one form of the postulate is more appropriate than others. For example, consistency postulates
similar to CN1′ and CN2′ have been proposed in [25] in the context of rule-based argumentation systems and versions of
CN1 and CN2 have been proposed in [19] for classical logics. It should be clear that CN2 entails CN1, CN2′ entails CN1′ , CN1
entails CN1′ and CN2 entails CN2′ .
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FreeArgs
(
GD
)⊆ πX
(
GD
)
(SC)
This postulate encodes our expectation that since free arguments are uncontroversial, they should be asserted in every
extension and, hence, in the sceptically accepted set as well.
Finally, we introduce a postulate that captures the expectation that there exists a knowledge base which is inconsistent
and for which some of the arguments, that can formed from the knowledge base, are not credulously accepted:
∃ s.t. NonFreeArgs(GD
) = ∅ and σX
(
GD
) = Nodes(GD
)
(CR)
This may seem like a relatively simple postulate, but we will see that it is a good postulate for differentiating the various
options we have for argumentation with classical logic. When the postulate fails, it means that for any knowledgebases ,
and for any argument A, if S(A) ⊆ , then A is credulously accepted. In other words, for any argument that can be formed
from a knowledgebase, there is a preferred extension that contains that argument. So if it does fail for an attack function D
and an extension semantics X , then this indicates that the combination of D and X is, in a sense, very credulous.
5. Status of postulates for argument graphs
In this section we examine the status of the postulates proposed in Section 4 under the various reviewed attack functions.
5.1. Postulate SC
First we show that when using any attack function satisfying D1, a free argument can neither be attacked by nor attack
another argument.
Proposition 11. Let A be a free argument in GD and let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D1. Then, there is no B ∈ Nodes(GD )
such that D(B, A) =  or D(A, B) = .
Proof. Let B ∈ Nodes(GD ) and suppose by way of contradiction that (B, A) ∈ Arcs(GD ), meaning that D(B, A) =  by
Deﬁnition 5. As D satisﬁes D1, this means that C(B)  ¬∧S(A). This further entails that S(A) ∪ S(B)  ⊥. Let M be the
minimal inconsistent subset of S(A) ∪ S(B). If M ∩ S(A) = ∅ then A cannot be free, thus contradicting our assumption. If
M ∩ S(A) = ∅, then it must be that M ⊆ S(B), contradicting the consistency of the support of B . In both cases we have a
contradiction. The case where A attacks B is proved in an identical way. 
Next we show that for any attack function satisfying D1, every complete extension will contain all free arguments in the
argument graph.
Proposition 12. Let S be a complete extension of GD and let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D1. Then, S ⊇ FreeArgs(GD ).
Proof. Arguments in FreeArgs(GD ) have no attacks whatsoever by Proposition 11, so trivially S defends them and therefore
must contain them. 
We can use the extension hierarchy to extend the previous result as follows.
Proposition 13. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D1. All reviewed extensions of GD contain all free arguments and therefore
postulate SC is satisﬁed.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 12 and the extension hierarchy (Fig. 1). 
Since all attack functions in {DD , DU , DCU , DDU, DDD, DR , DDR} satisfy D1, the above result shows that they all satisfy
postulate SC as well. Given that such a wide range of options for the attack function satisfy postulate SC, we may regard it
as an uncontroversial postulate.
5.2. Postulate CR
Here we present results on the satisfaction of CR. We do this for the categories of attack functions delineated in Table 2.
This means that we will use attack function postulates to prove that certain classes of attack functions satisfy or falsify CR.
For reasons to do with the structure of the proofs and economy of space we will address these attack function classes
for the stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete semantics ﬁrst, and then we will examine all these classes together for
the grounded and ideal semantics.
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In this section we examine the status of CR for the class of attack functions that satisfy D1, D2 and D6, and therefore are
super-relations of DCU . We begin by introducing a deﬁnition of a set of arguments that is generated by a set of formulae.
This is going to be a useful notion in the rest of this section.
Deﬁnition 14. Let Φ ⊆  be a consistent set of formulae. The set of arguments SΦ is generated by Φ iff
SΦ = {A ∈ A ∣∣ S(A) ⊆ Φ}
It should be clear that for any consistent Φ ⊆ , it is the case that SΦ ⊆ Nodes(GD ).
Next we show that for every consistent subset of Φ ⊆  we can ﬁnd an admissible set of arguments that contains every
argument based on Φ .
Proposition 15. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6, and letΦ ⊆  be a consistent set of formulae. Then, the set SΦ is admissible
in GD .
Proof. First we show that SΦ is conﬂict-free. Suppose that A, B ∈ SΦ and that D(A, B) = . Then as D satisﬁes D1 this
means that S(A)∪ S(B)  ⊥, a contradiction since Φ was assumed consistent.
We now show that SΦ defends itself. Let A ∈ SΦ and B an argument that attacks A, meaning that D(B, A) = . By
D1, it must be that S(A) ∪ S(B)  ⊥, thus S(A)  ¬∧S(B). We take Ψ to be the minimal subset of S(A) that entails
¬∧S(B). Then, C = 〈Ψ,¬∧S(B)〉 is an argument in Nodes(GD ) and by construction, C ∈ SΦ . By Proposition 7, we know
that D(C, B) = , completing the proof. 
We can now relate some consistent sets with stable extensions. For this, we require the notion of a maximal consistent
subset: For a set of formulae , Φ ⊆  is a maximal consistent subset iff Φ is consistent and for all Φ ′ ⊆ , if Φ ⊂ Φ ′ ,
then Φ ′ is not consistent.
Proposition 16. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6. Let Φ ⊆  be a maximal consistent set. Then, SΦ is a stable extension
of GD .
Proof. Clearly, SΦ is conﬂict-free, since it is admissible (Proposition 15). Thus, SΦ is a stable extension iff SΦ attacks A
for any A /∈ SΦ . For the latter to be the case, it must be that S(A)  Φ and from the maximality of Φ it follows that
Φ ∪ S(A)  ⊥. Let Ψ be the minimal subset of S(A) such that Ψ  ¬∧Φ . Then B = 〈Ψ,¬∧Φ〉 is an argument in GD . It
is also clear that B /∈ SΦ as otherwise the consistency of Φ would be contradicted. Consider the argument C = 〈Φ ′,∧Φ〉 ∈
SΦ , where Φ ′ ⊆ Φ is the minimal subset that entails the claim. From Proposition 7 we know that D(B,C) =  (since∧
Φ ′ ≡∧Φ). By the admissibility of SΦ it follows that there exists E ∈ SΦ such that D(E, B) = . By D1, it follows that
S(E)  ¬∧S(B) and thus S(E)  ¬∧S(A). Taking Ψ ′ ⊆ S(E) as the minimal set of formulae that entails ¬∧S(A), we
obtain F = 〈Ψ ′,¬∧S(A)〉 ∈ SΦ and by applying Proposition 7 again it follows that D(F , A) = , completing the proof. 
We are now in a position to address the status of CR with regards to attack functions that satisfy D1, D2 and D6 and all
extension semantics bar the grounded and ideal, which we address separately. Here, we prove that CR is falsiﬁed in these
circumstances by showing that for any , any argument is credulously accepted.
Proposition 17. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6, and let X be the stable, semi-stable, preferred or complete semantics. Then,
for any  and any argument A ∈ Nodes(GD ), A ∈ σX(GD ). Therefore, CR is not satisﬁed.
Proof. Let A ∈ Nodes(GD ) be an argument and let Φ ⊆  be a maximal consistent set of formulae such that S(A) ⊆ Φ
(such a set always exists by the consistency of supports of arguments). Then Proposition 16 applies conﬁrming that the set
of arguments SΦ is a stable (also semi-stable, preferred and complete) extension. Clearly, A ∈ SΦ . Thus, for any  and any
argument A there is a stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete extension that includes it, completing the proof. 
5.2.2. Attack functions based on direct undercuts
We will look next at the class of attack functions satisfying the postulates D1′ , D2 and D6′ . An attack function satisfying
these postulates would be a super-relation of DDU .
We again use maximally consistent sets to create stable extensions as follows. Note, a similar result to this was given by
Cayrol in [16]. The result may also be obtained via the correspondence established by Dung [3] relating stable extensions
with extensions of Reiter’s default logic where the attack relation is direct undercut, and the correspondence between
supernormal default theories and maximal consistent subsets of knowledgebases [26].
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in GD .
Proof. We ﬁrst show that SΦ is conﬂict-free. If not, then there would be A, B ∈ SΦ such that D(A, B) = , i.e., D(A, B) = 
and by D1′ , this means that S(A)∪ S(B)  ⊥, contradicting the consistency of Φ .
We next show that SΦ attacks any argument not in SΦ . Let A ∈ SΦ and B ∈ Nodes(GD ) \ SΦ . By construction, the
support of B must employ formulae not in Φ . Pick an arbitrary formula ψ ∈ S(B) \ Φ . As Φ is maximally consistent, it
must be that Φ ∪ {ψ} is inconsistent, therefore there is a minimal subset of Ψ ⊆ Φ such that Ψ  ¬ψ . This means that
C = 〈Ψ,¬ψ〉 is an argument and by construction C ∈ SΦ . Using Proposition 8 we obtain that D(C, B) = , completing the
proof. 
Using the above results we can show that the postulate CR is falsiﬁed.
Proposition 19. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1′ , D2 and D6′ , and let X be the stable, semi-stable, preferred or complete semantics. Then,
for any  and any argument A ∈ Nodes(GD ), A ∈ σX(GD ). Therefore, CR is not satisﬁed.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆  be a maximal consistent set of formulae such that S(A) ⊆ Φ . Then Proposition 18 applies conﬁrming
that the set of arguments SΦ is a stable (also semi-stable, preferred and complete) extension. Clearly, A ∈ SΦ . Thus, for
any  and any argument A there is a stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete extension that includes it, completing the
proof. 
5.2.3. Attack functions based on rebuttals
Here we examine the status of CR in the context of attack functions that are super-relations of rebuttals, i.e., those that
satisfy D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ . For these attack functions, we show that we can construct a stable extension.
Proposition 20. Suppose D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ , and A ∈ Nodes(GD ). Then there exists a stable extension of GD that con-
tains A.
Proof. A set of arguments generated by a maximally consistent subset of  will be an admissible set. However it will not
necessarily be a stable extension since it partitions the set of all arguments on the basis of their supports and not on the
basis of their claims. It is for this reason that we need the following deﬁnition.
Let Φ be a set of formulae such that:
(a) There exists φ ∈ Φ such that φ = C(A).
(b) If φ ∈ Φ then there exists B ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that φ = C(B).
(c) For any φ,ψ ∈ Φ , it is the case that {φ,ψ}  ⊥.
(d) There is no Ψ which satisﬁes the above conditions and is a proper superset of Φ .
Such a set must clearly always exist. We then deﬁne S ⊆ Nodes(GD ) to be the set of arguments whose claims are in Φ:
B ∈ S if and only if C(B) ∈ Φ .
First we show that S is conﬂict-free. Assuming the opposite, we obtain two arguments B,C ∈ S such that D(B,C) = .
Applying D1′′ we get that C(B)  ¬C(C), meaning that {C(B),C(C)}  ⊥ contradicting condition (c) above.
Now, we show that for any argument B ∈ Nodes(GD ) \ S , there is an argument C ∈ S such that D(C, B) = . Before
doing that we prove that Φ is closed under entailment. Suppose φ ∈ Φ and that φ  ψ and that ψ /∈ Φ . This can only be
because there is χ ∈ Φ such that {ψ,χ}  ⊥, or that ψ  ¬χ . But then φ  ¬χ contradicting the assumption that φ,χ ∈ Φ .
Next, we see that from the assumption that B /∈ S we obtain that C(B) /∈ Φ and, by condition (d) above, that there is C ∈
S such that {C(B),C(C)}  ⊥. Thus, C(C)  ¬C(B). However, Φ is closed under entailment as shown above, therefore there
must be an argument C ′ ∈ S such that C(C ′) ≡ ¬C(B). Applying Proposition 9 yields D(C ′, B) = , and thus, S attacks B . 
Proposition 21. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ , and let X be the stable, semi-stable, preferred or complete semantics. Then,
for any  and any argument A ∈ Nodes(GD ), A ∈ σX(GD ). Therefore, CR is not satisﬁed.
Proof. Proposition 20 applies conﬁrming that the set of arguments S is a stable (also semi-stable, preferred and com-
plete) extension. Clearly, A ∈ S . Thus, for any  and any argument A there is a stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete
extension that includes it, completing the proof. 
5.2.4. Attack functions based on undercuts
Finally, we consider the status of CR in the case of the class of attack functions that satisfy D1, D2 and D6′′′ . An attack
function satisfying these postulates would be a superset of DU .
Similarly to previous sections, we use maximally consistent sets of formulae to generate stable extensions as follows.
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in GD .
Proof. We ﬁrst show that SΦ is conﬂict-free. If not, then there are A, B ∈ SΦ such that D(A, B) = , and by D1, this means
that S(A)∪ S(B)  ⊥, contradicting the consistency of Φ .
We next show that SΦ attacks any argument not in SΦ . Let A ∈ SΦ and B ∈ Nodes(GD ) \ SΦ . By construction, the
support of B must employ formulae not in Φ . As Φ is maximally consistent, it must be that Φ ∪ S(B) is inconsistent. Thus,
there is a set Ψ ⊆ S(B) and a minimal set X ⊆ Φ such that C = 〈X,¬∧Ψ 〉 is an argument. By construction, it is the case
that C ∈ SΦ . Using D6′′′ , we obtain that D(C, B) = , completing the proof. 
Proposition 23. Suppose that D satisﬁes D1, D2 and D6′′′ , and let X be the stable, semi-stable, preferred or complete semantics. Then,
for any  and any argument A ∈ Nodes(GD ), A ∈ σX(GD ). Therefore, CR is not satisﬁed.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆  be a maximal consistent set of formulae such that S(A) ⊆ Φ . Then Proposition 22 applies conﬁrming
that the set of arguments SΦ is a stable (also semi-stable, preferred and complete) extension. Clearly, A ∈ SΦ . Thus, for
any  and any argument A there is a stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete extension that includes it, completing the
proof. 
5.2.5. The grounded and ideal extensions
We now turn to the ideal and grounded extensions and examine these in the context of all four attack function classes we
have seen before. What distinguishes the ideal and grounded extension is that they are ‘sceptical’ extensions by deﬁnition,
that is to say, there is exactly one ideal and one grounded extension at all times, and so some arguments will be excluded.
In the case of an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ , the ideal
and grounded extensions can only contain free arguments. To prove this, we ﬁrst show that any non-free argument has an
attacker.
Proposition 24. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ . If A ∈
NonFreeArgs(GD ) then there is an argument B ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that D(B, A) = .
Proof. As A is non-free, there exists a minimal inconsistent set M ∈ MI() such that M ∩ S(A) = ∅. It is easy to show that
in each case above, there exists an argument B ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that D(B, A) = . For the case D satisfying D1 and
D6, M ∩ S(A) = ∅ implies there is a C such that S(C) ⊆ M and C(C) ∪ S(A)  ⊥. Therefore, C(C)  ¬∧S(A). Therefore,
there is a B such that S(B) ⊆ S(C) and C(C)  C(B) and C(B) ≡ ¬∧S(A). Therefore, by the application of Proposition
13, D(B, A) = . For the case D satisfying D1′ and D6′ , M ∩ S(A) = ∅ implies there is a φ ∈ S(A) such that M \ {φ}  ¬φ.
Therefore, there is a B such that S(B) = M \ {φ} and C(B) = ¬φ. Therefore, by the application of Proposition 8, D(B, A) = .
For the case D satisfying D1 and D6′′′ , M ∩ S(A) = ∅ implies there is an X ⊆ S(A) and an argument B such that S(B) =
M \ X and C(B) ≡ ¬∧ X . Therefore, by D6′′′ , D(B, A) = . 
We also obtain the following weaker result for an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and D1′′ and D6′′ .
Proposition 25. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and D1′′ and D6′′ . If A ∈ NonFreeArgs(GD ) then there are arguments
B,C ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that S(B) = S(A) and D(C, B) =  and D(B,C) = .
Proof. As A is non-free, there exists a minimal inconsistent set M ∈ MI() such that M ∩ S(A) = ∅. Therefore, there exists
an argument B such that S(A) = S(B) and C(B) = ∧S(A). Since S(A) ⊆ M , there also exists an argument C such that
S(C) ⊆ M and C(C) = ¬∧S(A). Therefore, by the application of Proposition 9, D(C, B) =  and D(B,C) = . 
Now we can prove that the ideal and the grounded extensions are equal to the set of free arguments for an attack
function that satisﬁes D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ .
Proposition 26. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ . Then the ideal
and grounded extensions are equal to the set of free arguments.
σgr
(
GD
)= σid
(
GD
)= FreeArgs(GD
)
Proof. We begin by showing that the intersection of all preferred extensions does not contain any non-free arguments,
or πpr(GD ) ∩ NonFreeArgs(GD ) = ∅. Suppose A is a non-free argument. From Propositions 17, 19, and 23, we know that
there exists a preferred extension P A ∈ Epr(GD ) such that A ∈ P A . From Proposition 24 we obtain that there is an argument
B ∈ Nodes(G) such that D(B, A) = . By applying Propositions 17, 19 or 23, once again, we know that there is a preferredD
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A /∈ πpr(GD ). Thus, πpr(GD ) ⊆ FreeArgs(GD ).
It is known that for any argument graph Γ , the grounded extension is a subset of the ideal extension which, in turn, is
a subset of the intersection of all preferred extensions [13].
σgr(Γ ) ⊆ σid(Γ ) ⊆ πpr(Γ )
Combining Proposition 13 and the above result gives us
FreeArgs
(
GD
)⊆ σgr
(
GD
)⊆ σid
(
GD
)⊆ πpr
(
GD
)⊆ FreeArgs(GD
)
or in other words,
σgr
(
GD
)= σid
(
GD
)= FreeArgs(GD
) 
Finally, we address the status of CR for the ideal and the grounded extensions.
Proposition 27. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of the following pairs of postulates: D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ ,
or D1′′ and D6′′ , or D1 and D6′′′ . Then, the postulate CR is satisﬁed for the grounded and ideal extensions.
Proof. Suppose  is inconsistent. This means that MI() = ∅, and thus, NonFreeArgs(GD ) = ∅. For D that satisﬁes D2
and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ , it will be the case that FreeArgs(GD ) ⊂ Nodes(GD ) and there-
fore (by Proposition 26) σgr(GD ) = σid(GD ) = Nodes(GD ). For D that satisﬁes D2, D1′′ and D6′′ , it will be the case that
there are arguments A, B ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that D(B, A) =  and D(A, B) =  (following from Proposition 25). Therefore,
A /∈ σid(GD ) or B /∈ σid(GD ). Hence, σid(GD ) = Nodes(GD ). Also since σgr(GD ) ⊆ σid(GD ), σgr(GD ) = Nodes(GD ). 
The CR postulate has allowed us to differentiate the options for argumentation with classical logic where all arguments
that can be constructed from the knowledgebase are considered in the argument graph. For the credulous semantics (i.e.
stable, semi-stable, preferred, and complete semantics) we get that every non-free argument is contained in at least one, but
not all extensions, whereas for the sceptical semantics (i.e. grounded and ideal semantics) with the attack function satisfying
D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ , we get that the extensions contain no non-free arguments.
An interpretation of these results is that the credulous semantics is perhaps too credulous and the sceptical semantics is
perhaps too sceptical. Furthermore, these results suggest that a different defeat function or extension semantics should be
used or that an alternative to the argument generator (Deﬁnition 5) should be used. Alternatively, priorities over formulae,
and thereby over arguments, can be harnessed (e.g. [27,28]).
5.3. Consistency
In this section we look at the status of the consistency postulates. For the attack functions that only have free arguments
in the grounded and the ideal extensions, it is easy to see that CN1 will hold.
Proposition 28. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of the following pairs D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and
D6′′′ . Then, the postulate CN1 is satisﬁed for the grounded and ideal extensions.
Proof. As shown in Proposition 26, the ideal and the grounded extensions are equal to the set of free arguments. Let Φ =⋃
A∈FreeArgs(GD ) S(A) and suppose that Φ  ⊥. This means that there is M ∈ MI() such that M ⊆ Φ . But this means that
there is at least one argument A ∈ FreeArgs(GD ) such that M ∩S(A) = ∅, contradicting the deﬁnition of free arguments. 
We can generalise this result for the other extensions as follows.
Proposition 29. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and one of the following pairs D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and
D6′′′ . Then, for any of the reviewed extension semantics X,
πX
(
GD
)= FreeArgs(GD
)
Proof. We have already shown this result for the ideal and grounded extensions in Proposition 26. We do this here for the
stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete semantics.
From the extension hierarchy, we know that
Est
(
G
)⊆ Ess
(
G
)⊆ Epr
(
G
)⊆ Eco
(
G
)
D D D D
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πst
(
GD
)⊇ πss
(
GD
)⊇ πpr
(
GD
)⊇ πco
(
GD
)
From Proposition 12, we know that πco(GD ) ⊇ FreeArgs(GD ). Thus it suﬃces to show that πst(GD ) ⊆ FreeArgs(GD ).
Suppose that a non-free argument A is a member of πst(GD ). This means that A belongs to every stable extension of
GD . As shown in Proposition 24, there must be an argument B ∈ Nodes(GD ) such that D(B, A) = . By Propositions 17,
19 and 23, it follows that there is a stable extension SB containing B . But this leads to a contradiction, since A, B ∈ SB and
SB is a stable extension and, therefore, conﬂict-free. 
Thus, it is simple to show that CN1 is satisﬁed for attack functions that satisfy D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and
D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ .
Proposition 30. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2 and either D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ . Then, the
postulate CN1 is satisﬁed for the stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete extensions.
Proof. Let Core() =⋃M∈MI() M and let Free() =  \ Core(). Hence, Free()  ⊥. Also, A ∈ FreeArgs(GD ) iff S(A) ⊆
Free(). So,
⋃
A∈FreeArgs(GD ) S(A) ⊆ Free(). Hence,
⋃
A∈FreeArgs(GD )  ⊥. From Proposition 29, πX(G

D ) = FreeArgs(GD ).
Therefore,
⋃
A∈πX(GD )  ⊥. 
For an attack function that satisﬁes D2, and either D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ , it is clear that as CN1 is
satisﬁed, so is CN1′ by implication. Whereas for an attack function that satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ , we show that postulates
CN1 and CN1′ are not satisﬁed using the following examples.
Example 31. Let  = {a∧b,¬a∧c}. Hence, 〈{a∧b},b〉 and 〈{¬a∧c}, c〉 are arguments in πX(GD ) for the reviewed semantics
when an attack function that satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ , and clearly {a∧b,¬a∧ c}  ⊥. Hence, postulate CN1 is not satisﬁed
for an attack function that satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ .
Example 32. Consider the  = {a ∧ ¬c ∧ d, (¬a ∨ ¬b) ∧ c ∧ d,b ∧ c ∧ ¬d}. These formulae are pairwise inconsistent, and
so each argument from this knowledgebase has only one premise. Now, consider the following arguments which can be
formed from :
A1 =
〈{a∧ ¬c ∧ d},a〉
A2 =
〈{
(¬a∨ ¬b)∧ c ∧ d},¬a∨ ¬b〉
A3 =
〈{b ∧ c ∧ ¬d},b〉
For each Ai ∈ {A1, A2, A3}, there is no argument B from  such that B is a rebuttal of Ai . Therefore, A1, A2, and A3, belong
to each preferred extension of , and so {A1, A2, A3} ⊆ πX (GD ). However, {C(A1),C(A2),C(A3)}  ⊥. Therefore, postulate
CN1′ is not satisﬁed for an attack function that satisﬁes D1′′ , D2 and D6′′ .
Next we turn our attention to postulates CN2 and CN2′ . It is easy to see that due to Proposition 29 and the fact that
there is exactly one grounded and one ideal extension, these extension semantics will always satisfy CN2 and CN2′ , when
the attack function satisﬁes D2 and one of D1 and D6, or D1′ and D6′ , or D1 and D6′′′ . For an attack function that satisﬁes
D1′′ and D6′′ , we can use Example 31 to show postulate CN2 is not satisﬁed and Example 32 to show postulate CN2′ is not
satisﬁed. In what follows, we examine the remaining extension semantics. We begin by showing a general result regarding
postulate D3′ .
Proposition 33. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D3′ . Then any complete extension of GD is closed under sub-arguments
(where A is a sub-argument of B when S(A) ⊆ S(B)).
Proof. Suppose that S is a complete extension, A ∈ S , B is a sub-argument of A and that C is an argument that attacks B .
As S(B) ⊆ S(A) it follows from D3′ that D(C, A) = . But, as S is a complete extension it must defend A and therefore
defend B as well. Thus, B ∈ S . 
With Proposition 33 at our disposal we can approach the status of CN2 and CN2′ . Next, we show that attack functions
satisfying D2, D1′ , D6′ and D3′ , satisfy both of these postulates. Such attack functions include DDD and DDU .
Proposition 34. Let D be an attack function that satisﬁes D2, D1′ , D6′ and D3′ . Then, for any of the reviewed extension semantics X,
postulates CN2 and CN2′ hold.
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Fig. 4. Argument graph for Example 36.
Proof. Having already discussed the status of these postulates regarding the grounded and the ideal extensions, we only
need to address the case of the stable, semi-stable, preferred and complete extensions. Once again we will make use of the
extension hierarchy and prove that these postulates are satisﬁed for any complete extension. As all other extensions are
also complete, the result follows. Also, we will only show that CN2 is satisﬁed, as in that case, CN2′ will be satisﬁed by
implication. Suppose then that S ⊆ Nodes(GD ) is a complete extension.
Let Φ =⋃A∈S S(A). Aiming for a contradiction, assume that Φ  ⊥, or in other words, that there exists M ∈ MI() such
that M ⊆ Φ . Clearly, this means that there exists an argument A ∈ S such that M ∩ S(A) = ∅. Pick a formula ψ ∈ M ∩ S(A)
and consider the argument B = 〈M \ {ψ},¬ψ〉. Using Proposition 8, we conclude that D(B, A) =  and that, since S is
a complete extension, S must defend A. Thus, there exists an argument C ∈ S such that D(C, B) = . From D1′ follows
that there exists χ ∈ S(B), and therefore χ ∈ M , such that C(C)  ¬χ . There also exists an argument E = 〈Ψ,¬χ 〉 such
that Ψ ⊆ S(C) is the minimal subset that entails ¬χ . By Proposition 8, it follows that D(E, B) =  and as E is a sub-
argument of C it must be that E ∈ S , as shown in Proposition 33. As M ⊆ Φ and χ ∈ M there must exist an argument F ∈ S
such that χ ∈ S(F ). Another application of Proposition 8 yields that D(E, F ) = , contradicting the assumption that S is
conﬂict-free. 
The remaining attack functions, namely DD , DCU , DU , DR and DDR , do not satisfy CN2 nor CN2′ . We provide counterex-
amples below.
Example 35. Consider the knowledge base  = {a,b,¬a∨¬b} and suppose we are using the attack function DCU . It can be
seen that there is a stable extension containing all arguments, e.g., on the left column. Such an extension violates both CN2
and CN2′ . (See the argument graph presented in Fig. 3.)
Example 36. In a similar way to the last example, we will use the knowledge base  = {a,b,¬a∨¬b} again with the attack
function DU . We present the graph in Fig. 4: Here, there is a readily observable stable extension that violates CN2 and CN2′ ,
namely the ﬁve arguments marked with ∗ .
Example 37. We again use the knowledge base  = {a,b,¬a ∨ ¬b} with the attack function DD . The relevant part of the
graph is shown in Fig. 37. We use ⊕ to denote concisely the XOR operation, i.e., φ⊕ψ ≡ (φ∧¬ψ)∨ (¬φ∧ψ). It can be seen
that the ﬁve arguments marked with ∗ form part of a stable extension, while the union of their supports is inconsistent, as
well as the union of their claims. Thus DD fails to satisfy CN2 and CN2′ .
Example 38. We use the knowledge base  = {a ∧ b,a ∧ ¬b} and show that when using DR , the postulates CN2 and CN2′
are not satisﬁed. For this, we get the argument graph in Fig. 6. There are several stable extensions containing both the
arguments marked with ∗ . Every such stable extension violates both CN2 and CN2′ .
Note, Cayrol in [16] has also given an example that shows that DDR violates CN2.
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Fig. 7. Argument graph for Example 39.
Example 39. We show that DDR violates CN2 with the knowledge base  = {a ∧ b,a ∧ ¬b}. The argument graph is given in
Fig. 7. It should be clear that the set of arguments marked with ∗ is a stable extension that violates CN2 as well as CN2′ .
In conclusion, we can state the following. Postulates CN1 and CN1′ are satisﬁed by all combinations of extension seman-
tics with all attack functions considered in this paper that satisfy D3. Postulates CN2 and CN2′ are satisﬁed by all attack
functions considered in this paper that satisfy D3 in the case of the grounded and ideal extensions and only by DDD and
DDU in the case of the complete, preferred, semi-stable and stable semantics. As DDU is the most widely considered defeat
relation in the literature, it is interesting that the CN2 and CN2′ postulates hold with credulous semantics. However, the
failure of these postulates with other defeat relations is an issue that may be interpreted as a weakness of the defeat rela-
tion or of the speciﬁc semantics, and perhaps raising the need for alternatives to be identiﬁed. Another response is that it
is not the defeat relation and dialectical semantics that should be responsible for ensuring that all the premises used in the
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together should be the responsibility of something external to the defeat relation and dialectical semantics, and so knowing
whether the CN2 and CN2′ postulates hold or not inﬂuences what external mechanisms are required for checking. Further-
more, checking consistency of premises of sets of arguments may be part of the graph construction process. For instance,
in Garcia and Simari’s proposal for dialectical trees [29], there are constraints on what arguments can be added to the tree
based on consistency with the premises of other arguments in the tree.
6. Discussion
In this paper we have investigated the use of classical logic for constructing argument graphs. The ﬁrst component of
this approach is an attack relation and we have explored various desirable properties for them in Section 3. Using these
properties, we have been able to classify and characterise several concrete attack relations. We then proceeded to propose
postulates that express desirable requirements concerning the logical content of extensions of argument graphs constructed
using classical logic in Section 4. Now, we examine related work and discuss the ways that we can extend this research.
Classical logic has been considered previously as a logic for constructing argument graphs. Wooldridge, Dunne and Par-
sons, in [30], investigate the complexity of some decision problems on classical logic argumentation graphs with the direct
undercut attack relation. Although very interesting because of the computational issues raised, [30] does not examine the
properties of the content of extensions. In [27], Amgoud and Cayrol propose an argumentation framework with preferences,
which uses classical logic. The focus of the paper is on the use of preferences and, therefore, the consequences of using
classical logic are not investigated. In [19], Amgoud and Besnard have similar goals to ours and propose a consistency con-
dition which we have drawn upon for our postulates. They examine special cases of knowledge bases and symmetric attack
relations and whether consistency is satisﬁed in this context. Then in [20], Amgoud and Besnard extend this analysis by
showing a correspondence between the maximal consistent subsets of a knowledgebase and the maximal conﬂict-free sets
of arguments. Cayrol, in [16], presents results similar to Proposition 18 and Example 38. However, in all these cases, the
focus is on consistency and few other properties of the logical content of extensions are studied. In addition, there is a lack
of consideration of the range of attack relations.
Postulates regarding properties of logical argumentation graphs have been investigated before. Caminada and Amgoud
[25,18] and Caminada [31], propose a consistency postulate and a closure postulate (which we discuss further below). This
is done, however, in the context of a rule-based language as opposed to classical logic, and using a ﬁxed attack relation.
Similarly, Martínez, García and Simari, in [32], modify Dung’s deﬁnitions of acceptability to include the notion of warrant,
and in the process formulate a condition similar to D3′ , which they call conﬂict inheritance. In contrast to our work, [32]
stays at the level of abstract argument graphs and does not extend to the object-language level.
Given that we want our framework to capture existing proposals, we have allowed for arguments with syntactically
different supports to be differentiated. Hence, this means that we have speciﬁed that two arguments are equivalent if they
have identical support and logically equivalent claims. However, the framework can be adapted so that arguments A and B
are equivalent if they have logically equivalent support and logically equivalent claims. This then raises the need to consider
further postulates in future work such as the following:
if D(A, B) =  and S(B) ≡ S(C) then D(A,C) = (D3∗)
if D(A, B) =  and S(C) 
∧
S(B) then D(A,C) = (D3∗∗)
With regards to further work, several questions remain open. An important question is whether there exist postulates
other than those we examine here, that are interesting to study. As mentioned above, Caminada and Amgoud have proposed
a closure postulate in the context of rule-based argumentation systems. Such a principle could be encoded as follows in our
approach:
if
⋃
A∈πX(GD )
S(A)  φ then πX
(
GD
)
 φ(CL1)
if
⋃
A∈S
S(A)  φ then S  φ, for all S ∈ EX
(
GD
)
(CL2)
if
⋃
A∈πX(GD )
C(A)  φ then πX
(
GD
)
 φ(CL1′)
if
⋃
A∈S
C(A)  φ then S  φ, for all S ∈ EX
(
GD
)
(CL2′)
Here, the intuition is that if the arguments in an extension carry the information required to prove a particular formula,
then there should be an argument in the extension whose claim entails that formula. Once again there are several variations
possible on this principle, as seen above. Variations of the postulates CL1′ and CL2′ have appeared in [31,18]. Here, we
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CL1′ entails CL2′ , CL1′ entails CL1 and CL2′ entails CL2.
Another question for future work is the choice of deﬁnition for generating logical argument graphs. The deﬁnition for
the argument generator (Deﬁnition 5) which we use is a natural choice, but it would be useful to investigate alternative
deﬁnitions to account for proposals such as the argument tree deﬁnition in [6,9].
Recently, a number of interesting developments of abstract argumentation have been proposed. These build on Dung’s
proposal to provide more sophisticated modelling of argumentation, such as value-based argumentation framework (which
allow for the moral values of the audience to be taken into account) [33], bipolar abstract frameworks (which allow for
support relations to also be included) [34], argumentation frameworks with weighted attacks [35,36], extended frameworks
where arguments can express preference between other arguments [37,38]. It would be interesting, in future work, to
investigate the instantiation of these frameworks with classical logic, and at the same time identify new postulates to
constrain and justify these instantiations.
Finally, we have identiﬁed that for some attack relations, when Φ is a maximal consistent set, and SΦ is the set of
arguments generated by Φ (as given in Deﬁnition 12), then SΦ is a stable extension. So another interesting question is
whether the converse holds.
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